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failure to get a new job constituted consideration or his reliance
upon the payments (made by the corporation for four years)
created sufficient basis for the use of promissory estoppel as de-
fined in Section 90 of the Restatement. The first stated alterna-
tive is subject to the same criticism as the instant case in so fa)"
as absence of the bargain requirement is concerned. It will be
noted that the boundaries between Section 90 and Section 76
are blurred if, indeed, ascertainable at all in the Langer case.
Pennsylvania courts generally, as in the present instance, have
at least nominally adopted the Restatement of the Law of Con-
tracts. However, in the Mickshaw case the court has miscon-
strued Section 75 and ignored Section 90. It may have come to
a correct conclusion, but only in spite of the Restatement section
upon which it purports to rely. The transaction presents a clear
situation in which to argue plausibly for the application of the
Restatement concept of promissory estoppel. The promisor's
statement may have induced reasonable reliance by the promisee
-a matter of evidence-and injustice can perhaps be avoided
only by enforcing the promise. Although the court could have
reached the same result under Section 90, its present unhappy
construction of the Restatement creates unfortunate confusion,
and the purpose of the Restatement ".... to promote the clarifi-
cation and simplification of the law . . ." here remains un-
attained.17
FRANK M. MAYFIELD, JR.
THE PART OF THE LEGISLATURE IN DETERMINING THE QUALIFI-
CATIONS FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR.-Until recent times the
courts had consistently held that the judicial branch of govern-
ment should have the sole power to admit attorneys to the bar.
The legislature, employing its police power, could prescribe rea-
sonable requirements for the protection of the general public,
but the courts had the ultimate power to grant or deny licenses
to practice law. Recently, however, the legislatures of many
states have attempted to play a more significant role in prescrib-
ing qualifications requisite to admission to the bar. Typical was
a recent Idaho statute:
... the following applicants shlzl be admitted as attorneys
and counselors in all courts of this state without being re-
17. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS p. IV (1932).
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quired to pass any examination as to their qualifications
with respect to learning and ability, to-wit: Residents of
this state who are citizens of the United States, of the age
of twenty-one years and of good moral character, who are
graduates of the University of Idaho Law School, or grad-
uates of any law school which is a member of the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, or which has been approved
by the American Bar Association, or the Committee on
Legal Education of the American Bar Association, or by'
the Association of American Law Schools.' [Italics added]
Samuel Kaufmann had been graduated from an accredited
law school and apparently satisfied all other requirements of the
statute. On the basis of this he applied to the Idaho Supreme
Court for a license to practice law. Upon objection by the state
bar commissioners, the court denied petitioner a license, holding
the legislature's admissions law incompatible with the constitu-
tional proviso for a separation of governmental powers.2 The
court emphasized the fact that the Idaho legislature had en-
croached upon the judicial department's inherent power to pre-
scribe the maximumW qualifications for admission to the bar.
In reviewing the legal principles related to the Kaufmann case,
discussion will be confined to the consideration of three pertinent
questions, namely:
1. Is an attorney an officer of the court, and, if so, does
the judiciary have the sole power to admit him to the bar?
2. What qualifications, if any, may the legislature pre-
scribe as requisites for admission to the bar?
3. Did the legislature exceed its constitutional bounds in
the Kaufmann case?
1. The Attorney as an Officer of the Court.
The great majority of American courts have held that an at-
torney is an officer of the court.4 This rule of law was emphati-
cally stated by the Supreme Court in Ex Parte Garland :5
1. 2 IDAHO CODE ANN., § 3-101 (1949 P.P. Supp.).2. Application of Kaufman et al., 69 Idaho 297, 206 P.2d 528 (1949).
3. The word maximum is employed to demonstrate the difference be-
tween the power of the legislature and that of the courts, and the word
signifies that the courts can make more stringent qualifications, in addition
to the legislature's, as prerequisites to admission to the bar. Actually, of
course, the qualifications which the courts establish are minimum as to
applicants in that the courts provide the lowest requirements which will
allow admission to the bar.
4. Keeley v. Evans, Dist. Atty. et al., 271 Fed. 520 (D.C. Ore. 1921);
In re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 209 Pac. 948 (1922); Application of Levy, 23
Wash.2d 607, 161 P.2d 651 (1945).
5. 71 U.S. 366 (1867).
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Attorneys and counselors are not officers of the United
States; they are officers of the court, admitted as such by
its order, upon evidence of their possessing sufficient legal
learning and fair private character.,
Furthermore, it is equally well settled that the judicial depart-
ment alone has the final power to grant or deny an applicant a
a license to practice.7 Ruckenbrod v. Mullins" stated the general
proposition clearly:
It has been consistently held that the right of the legislative
branch of the government to regulate and control attorneys
is subject to the inherent power of the court ultimately to
control admission to practice and disbarment.9
Judicial omnipotence as to final denial or admittance of an appli-
cant is an ancillary aspect of the doctrines of separation of
powers-a doctrine first expressed by the French political scien-
tist Montesquieu, basic to our Federal Constitution, and ex-
plicitly incorporated into most 8tate constitutions. Therefore, it
is now well settled that an attorney is an officer of the court,
hence the judiciary has the ultim.iate authority to regulate admis-
sions to the bar.
2. The Legislature's Role in Prescribing Bar Requirements.
Conceding the fact that the courts have the ultimate and final
discretion as to licensing an attorney by virtue of the doctrine of
separation of powers, the question arises as to whether the legis-
lature, by virtue of any of its constitutional powers, can provide
any qualifications as conditions precedent to an applicant's privi-
lege to practice law. To this question an affirmative answer must
be given. A leading California case has enunciated the general
rule:
The manner, terms and conditions of their [attorneys'] ad-
mission to practice.., as well as their powers, duties, and
privileges, are proper subjects of legislative control.1o
6. Id. at 378.
7. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385 81 P.2d 96 (1938); In Te Lavine, 2 Cal.2d
324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal.
459, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929); In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App. 129, 234 Pac. 906
(1925); Hanson v. Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646 (1911); Ex Parte
Steckler et al., 179 La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934) ; In re Opinion of Justices,
279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932); State ex Tel. Johnson, Atty. Gen. v.
Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 295 N.W. 381 (1941); In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97
P.2d 556 (1939); In re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 209 Pac. 948 (1922); In To
Splane, 123 Pa. 527, 16 AtI. 481 (1889) ; In re Adkins et al., 83 W. Va. 673,
98 S.E. 888 (1919).
8. 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325 (1943).
9. Id. at 559, 133 P.2d at 330.
10. Ex parte Yale, 24 Cal. 242 (1864).
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This general proposition is amply supported by authority, 1 the
legislatures deriving this regulatory authority from their general
police power. The California case quoted above states the gen-
eral rule, but it is rather difficult to determine exactly how ex-
tensive legislative authority can be. It is agreed that a legisla-
tive enactment may require that an applicant be a citizen of the
United States, that he be a resident of that state, that he be at
least twenty-one years of age, and that he show proof of good
moral character.12
The courts are also in agreement that the legislature may re-
quire that an applicant have at least a minimum of legal learn-
ing.' 3 But a legislature may not discriminate against an appli-
cant because of sex, and a statute forbidding such discrimination
was struck down in In re Goodell.14 However, in Ex Parte Yale"s
a statute requiring all bar applicants to take an oath of allegiance
was declared constitutional. Another court held constitutional a
statute relating to the manner in which bar examinations should
be graded.16 In Application of LeVy'1 petitioner sought admis-
sion to the bar under a statute providing that any person serving
in the armed forces (during a certain period), and having grad-
uated from an accredited law school ". . . may me admitted to
practice law on motion before the Supreme Court."' 8 The court
held the statute constitutional, since it left to the judiciary the
final judgment as to an applicant's qualifications.
The legislation then, by exercising its police power, may pro-
vide certain prerequisites to licensing, fulfillment being a con-
dition precedent to applicant's admission to the bar. However,
the authorities are all in accord with the proposition that the
judiciary has the final discretionary power. To whatever the
legislature demands, the courts may annex additional qualifica-
11. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938); In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d
324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Brydonjack v. State Bar of California, 208 Cal.
459, 281 Pac. 1018 (1929); Vernon City Bar Association v. McKibbin, 153
Wis. 350, 141 N.W. 283 (1913) ; In re Adkins et al., 83 W. Va. 673, 98 S.E.
888 (1919); In re Application to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213 67 S.E. 597(1910).
12. Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334, 149 Pac. 286 (1915); In re Appli-
cation to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67 S.E. 597 (1910).
13. In re Application to Practice Law, 67 W. Va. 213, 67 S.E. 597 (1910).
14. 48 Wis. 693, 81 N.W. 551 (1879).
15. 24 Cal. 242 (1864).
16. In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180 N.E. 725 (1932).
17. 23 Wash.2d 607, 161 P.2d 651 (1945).
18. Id. at 609, 161 P.2d at 653.
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tions, and in no case has it been held that a legislature can actu-
ally admit an attorney to the bar. The well settled rule is: The
courts may not accept less than the legislature has required of an
applicant, but may demand more.
3. Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Legislative Provisions.
Did the Idaho Legislature, in drafting its statute, overstep its
bounds and encroach upon the judiciary? One's answer depends
on interpretation of the statutory language, but probably should
be in the affirmative since the great weight of authority is in
accord with the result reached by the Idaho court.
The decision reached in the Kaufmann case seems to rest al-
most entirely upon the interpretation which must be given to the
statutory phrase indicating that persons meeting certain defined
qualifications shall be admitted as attorneys. Overruling peti-
tioner's contention that the word shall should be construed as
being merely directory, the court held that the use of the word
imposed a mandate upon the court, and that once an applicant
met the requirements set out, the statute compelled admission.
This compulsion by the legislature, said the court, was an illegal
encroachment upon the powers reserved to the judiciary. In re
Day 9 is a leading case involving a similar situation. Here an
Illinois statute required that the supreme court ".... shall issue a
license to practice law to law students.. ." who had met certain
defined qualifications. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the
legislature had no power to provide that a person fulfilling statu-
tory requirements must be admitted, and declared the statute
unconstitutional.20 A Pennsylvania court held a similar statute
unconstitutional because it left "no discretion to the court to re-
ject a person ascertained to be unfit to practice before it. ' '21 In
construing a statute which required that "any graduate of a
'Grade A' law school shall be admitted to the bar," the Oklahoma
court held it unconstitutional, saying that it constituted "an
invasion of the inherent power of the Supreme Court to fix the
maximum requirements for admission to the practice of law.'' 22
In all of these .cases, the courts have declared that the word
shall renders the statute mandatory, and leaves the judiciary no
19. 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646 (1899).
20. Ibid.
21. In re Splane, 123 Pa. 527, 16 Atl. 481 (1899).
22. In re Bledsoe, 186 Okla. 264, 97 P.2d 556 (1939).
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alternative but to admit any applicant who has fulfilled the pre-
scribed requirements. Not one of these courts construed shall as
being a directory provision, which would allow the judiciary to
provide additional requirements for admission to the bar. It
should be noted that where legislatures have drafted similar
statutes but have substituted the word may in place of the word
shall, courts have held these laws simply directory-and con-
stitutional. In such instances the courts retained power to add
further qualifications to those demanded by law. The rule of
these decisions is well stated in In re Greer :23
It is true that the legislatures of the various states may, and
often do, prescribe minimum qualifications which must be
possessed by those who desire . . to practice [law], and
the courts will require all applicants to comply with the
legislative conditions... but notwithstanding that an appli-
cant may possess the qualifications required by the legisla-
ture, this does not entitle him to admission to practice unless
the court is satisfied that such qualifications are sufficient.24
In other words, the legislature, by virtue of its police power,
may prescribe reasonable conditions to an applicant's admission
to the bar. But in no case has the legislature been allowed to set
the maximum requirements beyond which the judicial depart-
ment may go. This proposition represents the great weight of
authority25 and the Kaufmann decision is consistent therewith.
WALTER M. CLARK
TORTS--GUEST STATUTE APPLICATION BROADENED-PROTEC-
TION WHILE GUEST ENTERING CAR DURING TRIP.-Ella Castle
had been accompanying McKeown in his auto on a day-long sum-
mer outing from Lansing to a nearby lake resort. Returning that
evening and still some distance from the Michigan capital, Mc-
Keown stopped his car on an upgrade to examine a soft rear
23. 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938).
24. Id. at 390, 81 P.2d at 98.
25. Keeley v. Evans, Dis't Atty. et al., 271 Fed. 520 (D.C. Ore. 1921);
In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935) ; In re Chapelle, 71 Cal. App.
129, 234 Pac. 906 (1925); Freeling v. Tucker, 45 Idaho 475, 289 Pac. 85
(1930) ; Anderson v. Coolin, 27 Idaho 334, 149 Pac. 286 (1915) ; Hanson v.
Grattan, 84 Kan. 843, 115 Pac. 646 (1911); Ex parte Steckler et al., 179'
La. 410, 154 So. 41 (1934); In re Opinion of Justices, 279 Mass. 607, 180
N.E. 725 (1932); State ex rel. Johnson, Atty. Gen. v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91,
295 N.W. 381 (1941); In re Crum, 103 Ore. 296, 209 Pac. 948 (1922);
Vernon City Bar Association v. McKibbin, 153 Wis. 350, 141 N.W. 283
(1913).
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